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Introduction 
Throughout the world large scale demographic, 
political and economic changes have transformed 
relations among rural land users and between them and 
the natural resources they use and manage. Pervasive 
changes include the expansion of markets and monetized 
exchange relations into hinterland areas, the increasing 
assertion of state claims to control and regulate natural 
resources which were, in many cases, previously under 
some sort of local jurisdiction, demographic shifts in 
population densities and growth rates, and emerging 
participatory political systems. The redistribution of 
power, access, control, and ability to exclude that these 
processes entail has produced myriad forms of conflict 
among rural land users and between them and various of 
state entities. The ensuing fault lines of conflict range 
in scale from gender-based intrahousehold negotiation 
and contestation (Schroeder 1993, Carney 1993) to 
competition for resource access and control between 
peasant groups differentiated by economic interests, kin 
alliances, class and ethnicity (Ensminger and Rutten 
1991) to conflicts and alliances between peasant groups 
and state agencies (Moore 1993, Neumann 1992, Peluso 
1992). 
Local institutions that regulate the provision, 
distribution and utilization of common resources 
constitute a mid-level site on which the multiple 
tensions accompanying large scale political and 
economic change manifest themselves. One particularly 
common form of economic change is the expansion of 
monetized market exchange relations into areas where 
previously they did not exist or where they existed in 
muted forms only. Market expansion generally 
increases the economic differentiation within an area as 
some individuals take advantage of new economic 
opportunities while others do not. The lines of 
differentiation often follow preexisting axes of 
inequality such as gender, caste, class, ethnicity and/or 
wealth. Increasing market-based economic 
opportunities generate tensions within institutions 
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which manage common resources because they 
differentially reduce the dependence on and hence value 
of the resource for those who have access to new 
economic opportunities. Polanyi (1944) and Jodha 
(1985) have shown that these tensions erode common 
property resource institutions by weakening individuals' 
dependence on the benefits the resource provides. 
Polanyi and Jodha suggest that as increasing reliance on 
outside income reduces dependence on local resource 
systems, then institutions for managing those systems 
will lose support. 
While this formulation is true in a general sense, it 
does not capture the remarkable diversity of impacts of, 
and responses to, increasing nonfarm employment 
observable among the gravity flow irrigation systems 
(kuhls) in Kangra Valley, Himachal Pradesh. Two axes 
of differentiation help to identify variation in response 
among kuhl regimes .1 The first is the degree of role 
specialization and organizational formalization of the 
kuhl regime and the second is the extent of state 
involvement in kuhl management. The degree of role 
specialization and formalization ranges from informal 
kuhl regimes with no specialized roles or formal rules, 
to highly specialized and formalized kuhl regimes with 
multiple watermasters, a formal kuhl committee with 
1 By kuhl regime I mean the complex of physical 
structures which comprise a kuhl and the social 
relations and institutional arrangements necessary for its 
construction, repair and maintenance. In addition to 
pressures associated with political economic changes, 
kuhls are also subject to recurring environmental 
shocks, i.e. floods, earthquakes and drought, which 
threaten the ability of kuhl regimes to maintain their 
integrity. For an analysis of the interconnectedness of 
kuhls and of how inter-kuhl networks reduce the risks of 
environmental dependence see Baker, J.M. (1995) 
"Irrigation Networks in the Western Himalayas: 
Methodological and Conceptual Implications for Public 
Administration Theory." 
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elected officers, extensive written records and 
sophisticated methods for measuring water flow. 
Similarly, state involvement in kuhl management 
varies greatly, from minimal degrees of involvement in 
some kuhl regimes to the entire management of others. 
In this paper, based on fieldwork among the 39 
kuhls which divert water from the Neugal River just 
west of the town of Pal am pur in Kangra Valley, I argue 
that the variations among kuhls in their degree of 
formalization and the extent of state involvement can be 
explained by examining the specific configurations of 
social relations and ecological conditions which 
characterize each kuhl regime. I show how the 
particular combination of social relations and ecological 
conditions within a kuhl system shape the tensions 
arising from increasing nonfarm employment as well as 
the means people employ to resolve those tensions. 
Furthermore, I argue that the varied roles the state of 
Himachal Pradesh plays in the management of different 
kuhls results from negotiations between various state 
agents and the persons involved in kuhl management. 
This negotiation, and the outcomes in degree of state 
involvement in water management, are shaped by local 
social and ecological influences rather than by the 
blanket application of a homogenous "policy" across a 
socially and ecologically differentiated landscape. 
The topography of Kangra Valley, a series of gently 
sloping alluvial fans spreading outwards from the base 
of the Dhaula Dhar mountains, creates opportunities for 
irrigated agriculture at a scale unusual in the Himalaya. 
Each alluvial fan in the valley is bisected longitudinally 
by a stream or river originating in the Dhaula Dhar. 
From their narrow headwater canyons to their 
disappearance into the erosive canyons of the Sivalik 
Hills ten to twelve kilometers to the south, they each 
supply water to as many as forty or fifty different 
aravity flow irrigation systems. These irrigation ~ystems consist of a diversion structure, a main channel 
ranging in length from less than one kilometer to more 
than 40 kilometers, numerous secondary and tertiary 
channels and hundreds of named distribution points. 
The initial construction of the longest and most 
complex kuhls was occasionally sponsored by pre-
colonial local rulers. However the majority of the 
kuhls in Kangra Valley were constructed without state 
patronage either by local elites or collectivities of 
farmers. By the beginning of British colonial rule in 
Kangra in 1850, responsibility for managing and 
repairing each kuhl rested with the cultivators of the 
land the kuhl irrigated (Coward 1990). Approximately 
715 major kuhls and more than 2500 minor kuhls 
irrigate more than 30 ,000 hectares in the valley. 
The areas irrigated by kuhls differ tremendously in 
agricultural productivity, the availability of irrigation 
water from post-monsoon annual streams, and the social 
relations among irrigators. Some kuhls irrigate only 
highly productive rice and wheat growing fields located 
near the perennial streams flowing from the Dhaula 
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Dhar. Other kuhls, after traversing the fertile riverine 
terraces, transport water several kilometers and deliver it 
to the less fertile agricultural areas on the ridges and 
plateau tops above the perennial streams. In some areas 
local annual streams which flow after the onset of the 
monsoon reduce an irrigator1s reliance on water 
transported from the more distant perennial rivers. The 
irrigators of kuhls may be relatively homogeneous or 
considerably different in caste and wealth distribution. 
Differences can be exacerbated when upper caste farmers 
cultivate the headend areas of a kuhl1s command area and 
lower caste farmers cultivate tailend areas. 
Local Determinants of the Effects of 
Environmental Change 
The diverse social and ecological contexts of the 
kuhls of Kangra Valley provide a rich arena in which to 
examine the conflicts which arise when economic 
change alters shared dependence on a common resource. 
Agriculture in the area remains primarily oriented to 
subsistence grain production. However, a rapidly 
expanding nonfarm employment sector has provided 
unprecedented opportunities for (mostly male) off-farm 
employment. For example, in the Neugal River basin 
at the base of the Dhaula Dhar range, between 1961 and 
1991 the numbers of males engaged in full-time 
nonfarm employment more than tripled, while those 
engaged in full-time agricultural work remained about 
the same.2 Households which draw income from 
nonfarm employment now have less incentive to 
contribute the labor necessary for kuhl maintenance and 
repair, and to comply with rules regulating the control 
of, access to and use of irrigation water, than 
households without nonfarm employment income. 
The disincentive to contribute labor and/or money 
for kuhl maintenance and repair is also influenced by the 
potential for conflict among a kuhl's irrigat~r~ and ~he 
use value of the water a kuhl delivers. The dismcentive 
is greatest either when a kuhl irrigates primarily low 
value crops for which alternative post-monsoon water 
supplies are available, or when caste, .class or 
locationally derived inequalities generate conflict among 
farmers. The disincentive to contribute towards the 
provision of irrigation water is least when the kuhl 
irrigates high value crops and when inequalities among 
irrigators are minimal. Furthermore, the s~~e loc~l 
factors which influence disincentives to participate m 
kuhl management also affect the degree of regime 
formalization, if any, and the extent of state 
2 This information comes from the Riwaj-i-Abpashi 
(Book of Irrigation Customs) compiled as part of the 
1915 settlement of District Kangra. A major kuhl has a 
perennial water source and irrigates n:o .or more . 
villages. The Himachal Pradesh Statistical Outhne 
(1990:58) notes that in 1988, of the 32,511 hectares of 
irrigated land in the district, 30,895 were irrigated by 
kuhls and lift irrigation systems and 1 ,616 hectares were 
irrigated by wells and tube wells. 
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intervention in kuhl management. Ten of the thirty-
nine kuhls within the Neugal basin deliver water to 
high value crops and have irrigators who are ~ot divided 
by class or caste differences. These kuhls are mformally 
organized with no watermaster and are managed 
independently of any state involvement. At the other 
end of the extreme are kuhls which deliver water to low 
value crops and whose irrigators are divided by class or 
caste inequalities. For these kuhl regimes the stresses 
predicted by Polanyi and Jodha were so great .tha~ th~y 
collapsed and the kuhls literally stopped functwnmg m 
the late 1960's and early 1970's. The panchayats 
included within the command area of each of these 
defunct kuhls negotiated with the Himachal Pradesh 
Irrigation and Public Health Department (IPH) for the 
department to assume responsibility for the 
management of these kuhls under the Himachal Pradesh 
Minor Canals Act. As a result, nine of the thirty-nine 
kuhls within the Neugal basin are presently managed by 
the IPH Department. The willingness of the IPH 
Department to assume management responsibility for 
defunct kuhls, and of other state agencies and 
departments to subsidize the repair of other kuhls, has 
helped preserve the overall viability of the kuhl 
networks within the Neugal basin. The various reasons 
for the willingness of these state agencies to subsidize 
irrigation management are grounded in the ideology of 
the developmentalist socialist welfare state. 
Instrumentalist motivations within the IPH Department 
include increasing the department's power relative to 
other departments, and justifying an expanding budget. 
A less direct motivation which drives the giving of 
subsidies for kuhl repair by the civil administration and, 
on occasion, grants brokered by a local Member of the 
Legislative Assembly (MLA), is the expectation of 
political support in return for financial subsidies. The 
remaining twenty of the thirty-nine kuhls irrigate 
mostly high value crops whose cultivators are 
characterized by various inequalities. Increasing 
nonfarm employment has weakened the social basis for 
cooperation within these kuhl regimes, thereby 
allowing differences rooted in caste, land ownership and 
position within the kuhl's command area, to manifest as 
conflicts within various arenas of kuhl management. In 
response to conflict, the members of these kuhl regimes 
have formalized their manner of self-organization by 
creating elected kuhl committees, formalizing 
previously informal rules governing the distribution of 
responsibility for kuhl repair and maintenance, 
instigating and enforcing fines and other sanctions for 
those who violate rules, and in one case substituting 
monetary for labor contributions for kuhl maintenance 
and repair. 
I turn now to a brief review of the effects of 
increasing nonfarm employment on these kuhls. By 
using brief vignettes I will show how particular 
intersections of social and environmental characteristics 
influence the tensions resulting from increased nonfarm 
employment, such as declining participation in kuhl 
maintenance work parties, shifts in the burden of 
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responsibility for kuhl maintenance from headend to 
tail end farmers, and the declining authority of the 
watermaster. 
Declining Participation 
Without exception, kohlis, the local pahari term for 
watermaster, cited mobilizing farmers for kuhl 
maintenance as their most difficult problem.3 In 1991, 
due to low farmer turn-out on the appointed work days, 
Shri Laxman Das, the kohli for Kathul Kuhl, could 
neither complete the annual cleaning of the kuhl nor 
reconstruct the diversion structure. That year no 
irrigation was possible prior to the monsoon. 
Similarly, in 1988 because so few farmers turned out to 
clean and repair Raniya Kuhl, the kohli, Shri Kishori 
Lal, dismissed the work party and instead hired migrant 
laborers from Rajasthan to do the work.4 Attendance 
registers for Pathan Kuhl also show that the number of 
farmers participating in kuhl maintenance has declined 
in recent years. 5 
3 Of the thirty non-government managed kuhls in the 
Neugal basin, twenty have kohlis. The kohli is . 
responsible for mobilizing the communal work parties 
necessary for maintaining and repairing the kuhl, for 
performing the religious ceremonies associated with 
kuhl management, for supervising the transport and 
distribution of water in the kuhl, and for resolving 
conflicts between farmers regarding water use. Twelve 
kohlis have begun to keep attendance registers in which 
they note who was present and who was absent when 
work parties are organized. While all attendance 
registers record who contributes labor and who does not, 
the dynamics of declining participation and hence the 
function of the attendance register vary from kuhl to 
kuhl. Participation in the annual communal work 
parties to clean the kuhl and reconstruct the diversion 
structure may decline for political or economic reasons 
among big or small landowners. In some kuhls 
participation may have been low previously, while in 
others low participation may be a recent phenomenon. 
As the reasons for declining participation vary, so does 
the purpose, meaning and effectiveness of the attendance 
register. 
4 Shri Kishori Lal reported that only ten years ago 
eighty to one hundred men would show up for the four 
days required to clean and repair Raniya Kuhl. In 1993 
only 21 individuals, mostly young boys or elderly men, 
came. 
5 Between 1978 and 1991 the maximum number of 
participating farmers on a given day declined from 
between 90 and 100 to between 30 and 40. And the 
total number of persondays contributed per year also 
declined during this period. The kohli for Pathan Kuhl, 
Shri Dhyan Singh confirmed this trend by stating that 
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The reasons for the decline in participation in 
Raniya, Path an and Kathul Kuhls vary. Declining 
dependence on kuhl water with a low end use value 
accounts for reduced participation in Kathul Kuhl. The 
"pull'' of nonfarm employment opportunities accounts 
for declining participation in Pathan Kuhl even though 
tt delivers water with a high end use value. Although 
Raniya Kuhl also delivers water to high value crops, its 
irrigators are divided by caste and land based inequality 
and conflict. Low caste small landholders leaving 
Raniya Kuhl to escape these inequalities account for 
declining participation rates in this kuhl. Declining 
participation, while a common phenomenon, has 
different causes and effects. 
Distribution of Responsibility for System 
Maintenance 
The burden of kuhl maintenance has always fallen 
more heavily on downstream irrigators. Customary 
rules for allocating responsibility for kuhl maintenance 
and repair between head- and tailenders simultaneously 
acknowledge this tendency and attempt to mitigate it. 
The declining dependence on agriculture and the 
consequent weakening of intetdependence among 
households has reduced the leverage that downstream 
users have on headenders for system maintenance. This 
is especially true when caste differences intersect with 
locationally derived inequalities. 
Buhli Kuhl exemplifies this point. The seventeen 
hamlets Buhli Kuhl irrigates are Rajput-dominated at 
the head of the kuhl, and are primarily lower caste at the 
tail end. Due to the caste bias of participation in 
nonfarm employment, upstream Rajputs became 
proportionately less dependent on kuhl water than the 
downstream, lower caste, households. Upstream Rajput 
contributions to kuhl maintenance and repair declined, 
leading downstream lower caste hamlets to withdraw 
from the kuhl. Residents of these hamlets now must 
sow paddy using the less productive dry-seed broadcast 
method instead of the more productive but water-
intensive sprouted-seed broadcast method, and they must 
depend on timely rains for irrigation. 
Declining Kohli Authority 
The inability of the kohli of Buhli Kuhl to enforce 
rules governing the distribution of the burden of kuhl 
maintenance and repair among farmers reflects the 
general erosion of the kohli's authority. The basis of 
the kohli's authority and the legitimacy for rules 
governing kuhl management was common dependence 
on kuhl water. The fragmentation of this dependence, 
although moderated by ideologically compelling norms 
of reciprocity and hierarchical relations, nevertheless 
weakens the legitimacy of rules and the ability of 
village based authorities to enforce them. 
declining farmer participation for kuhl maintenance and 
repair was his biggest headache. 
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Previously the position of kohli carried respect and 
prestige. When the demand for kuhl water peaked for 
paddy sowing and water supply was at its annual 
minimum, the kohli walked his kuhl overseeing water 
distribution and resolving water conflicts on the spot. 
His long turban and cane were adequate reminders of his 
authority and helped ensure that his word held. Now the 
hereditary right to be kohli, in some cases, is a liability 
rather than a privilege. Many current kohlis state that 
they would prefer their sons to get nonfarm jobs and not 
assume the responsibilities associated with the 
relatively thankless, difficult and poorly remunerated job 
of kohli. 
Kuhl Regime Responses to Environmental 
Change 
Kuhl regimes have responded to stresses by 
instituting changes at the operating and institutional 
levels (Ciriacy-Wantrup 1969). Responses at the 
operating level include changes in the remuneration for 
the kohli, the mobilization of resources for kuhl 
maintenance and repair, and the formality of kuhl 
management activities. Responses at the institutional 
level include the formation of kuhl committees, with 
their varied structures, functions, and degrees of 
effectiveness. The combination of responses among 
different kuhl regimes reflects each regime's particular 
set of social and ecological characteristics rather than a 
common response to shared tensions and conflicts. For 
example, although kuhl committees are structurally 
similar, some were formed to address increasing internal 
conflict while others were primarily formed to negotiate 
with the state. 
Kuhl Committees 
In 1993, there were fourteen kuhl committees within 
the Neugal basin. Local officers of the Punjab State 
Government organized two of the earliest kuhl 
committees in the early 1950's as part of a more general 
effort to form Agricultural Cooperative Societies. 
These two initial "cooperative irrigation societies" 
constituted the blueprint for subsequent kuhl 
committees, though the irrigators themselves rather 
than government officers created the later committees. 
Kuhl committees were formed for three reasons. The 
most common reason was to strengthen the declining 
authority of the kohli to enforce rules and mobilize 
labor. A second reason was to facilitate the 
negotiations with the various agents of the state 
necessary to acquire monetary support for kuhl system 
repair and maintenance. The last reason is to defend the 
kuhl regime members' water claims against an external 
threat. For example, the shareholders of Bhradi Kuhl 
organized a committee to challenge in court the IPH 
Department's proposed construction of an upstream kuhl 
which would threaten their water supply: they were 
successful. Evolving RulesKuhl committees provide a 
forum for the creation and modification of rules. The 
effectiveness of rules varies according to the nature and 
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degree of conflict within the kuhl regime. Three 
examples of changes in the operating rules of kuhls are 
the creation of fine systems, the substitution of money 
in lieu of labor for kuhl maintenance and repair, and 
increases in the remuneration rates for kohlis. Every 
kuhl regime that maintains attendance records has 
developed a system for fining households which do not 
contribute labor for kuhl maintenance. For example the 
committee for Pangwan Kuhl, whose irrigators are 
mostly all Rajput farmers with relatively similar 
landholdings, levies and collects a fine, and gives a 
receipt, for every six or seven days of absence. On the 
other hand, for Raniya Kuhl, which is divided by caste 
conflict and wealth inequalities and a committee 
controlled by a few large landowning families, the 
kohli, Shri Kishori Lal, neither maintains accurate 
attendance records nor even attempts to collect fines. 
The fine system in Samruhl Kuhl led to women from 
female-headed households participating in communal 
work parties. This violated the prescription against 
female participation in any communal aspect of kuhl 
management. In response, the kuhl committee and 
irrigators of the kuhl substituted a monetary fee based 
on the area a household cultivates in lieu of labor 
contributions. The specific configuration of social 
relations among the irrigators of a kuhl has shaped the 
meaning and effectiveness of structurally similar 
changes. Some examples: the committee for Raniya 
Kuhl was a means (albeit not terribly successful) for 
local elites to maintain their threatened hierarchical 
authority; for Samruhl Kuhl the structurally identical 
committee was the vehicle for shifting from labor to 
monetary contributions for kuhl maintenance and repair; 
and the fine system of the Pangwan Kuhl committee 
effectively mitigated against the pull of nonfarm 
employment. 
Conclusion 
The title of this paper, "Changing Contexts, Steady 
Flows," suggests that although the unprecedented 
expansion of nonfarm employment opportunities has 
transformed the context of irrigation in Kangra, water 
continues to flow through the kuhl channels as it has 
done for the last several hundred years. This paper has 
conveyed an idea of the transformations in the 
organization of irrigation management, and in the mix 
of local/state authority for irrigation management, 
which has been necessary in order to achieve this 
constancy of flow. And it has shown how local level 
factors shape the effects of environmental change, the 
trajectory of response to those effects, and the extent of 
state involvement in kuhl management. 
At the basin level increasing nonfarm employment 
opportunities initiated a sequence of responses that 
produced new patterns of authority and organization for 
water management. These differential patterns of 
change within individual kuhls created a web of multi-
jurisdictional, interconnected kuhl networks that would 
appear highly resilient at the basin level, because each 
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kuhl finds its own equilibrium mix of state and local 
authority and management structure for a particular type 
and rate of contextual change and its own configuration 
of social and ecological characteristics. The existing 
basin level pattern of authority and organization for 
water management suggests that while specific 
organizational forms, operations, and scales of regime 
management did not persist unchanged, the overall 
pattern of kuhl networks within the basin transformed 
in order to endure. 
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